Legitimacy is an intrinsically “slippery” concept, whether used politically or academically. It is usually observed and measured by a counterfactual, namely, that the citizens of a given polity – democratic or not – seem to act voluntarily and do not ignore, subvert, distort, demonstrate against or even rebel against the commands of their authorities. This can be very misleading since their observed “non-behaviour” may be due to ignorance, fear of reprisal, self-interest or just plain habit.
The legitimacy of the European Union has increasingly been questioned – and more so recently. It has often been presumed that this is due to its alleged “democracy deficit” which assumes that its citizens expect it to be not only democratic, but in ways that are similar to what they have experienced at the national and sub-national levels. These same citizens do not seem to care that other trans-national organizations such as the United Nations, the World Trade Organization, the International Monetary Fund or the North Atlantic Treaty Organization are much less democratic in their decision-making than the EU, and still have a quite significant impact upon the welfare and safety of their subjects. Of course, these organizations do not claim to be democratic (as the EU does) and they rely exclusively on the legitimacy generated by the outcomes of their presumably beneficial activities.
In a previous paper (No.6), I have argued that this democracy deficit is more a product of academics and public intellectuals than of mass publics who seem most often to conform voluntarily to the EU’s directives and regulations. Almost all of them depend for their direct implementation on national and sub-national authorities. It is often their administrative deficiencies or unwillingness to transpose these commands accurately or to apply them faithfully that generates the failure for citizens to comply or their propensity to react negatively. I repeat a point made earlier, that it is national democracies and their administrations that are more democratically deficient than the EU in the perception of most citizens.[1] Moreover, the latter relies almost exclusively on “Legitimacy through Law,” rather than on the extraction of revenue or direct distribution of goods. It has no “own” capacity to force publics to comply – no coercive institutions that might directly enforce its commands upon citizens or their organizations.
Surveys of public opinion in most member-states seem to conform to this assertion. In many of them, respondents even report that they trust the EU more than their respective national governments and elsewhere the percentages are barely different.[2] What this suggests is that there is a growing general resentment and rejection of political authorities, regardless of the level at which they articulate and apply their commands.[3]
Also, more direct evidence for EU illegitimacy is hard to find. Rarely do its citizens assemble or even write to protest its directives or regulations. If, as we have argued above, it is measured counterfactually by what does not happen, then, one has to conclude that it has generally proven capable of attracting the voluntary compliance of its citizens. Most of what emerges from surveys are momentary opinions rather than operative values and only occasionally do they get translated into actual behaviour. Granted that the distance to Bruxelles is considerable for most of them, that its decisions frequently concern relatively obscure (if consequential) matters and their actual impact is mediated through national and sub-national agents, nevertheless, the EU’s illegitimacy is more often inferred than observed.
Legitimacy also involves the treatment that a governing (or, better, “governancing”) institution is given by outside polities or publics. In this regard, the EU is a remarkable success. It regularly participates in the highest-level Summit Meetings of Heads of State, is recognized by almost all existing national states as a reliable, effective and even desirable interlocutor, and has an extensive “External Service” with representatives distributed worldwide. Moreover, the recent efforts by one of its neighbors, Russia, to discredit it and to divide its members against each other has not only proven to be relatively ineffectual, but has probably done more to increase rather than decrease its legitimacy.
This does not mean that the EU should not be concerned about its legitimacy.[4] All polities, including ones in formation, have to do so, and more so with the growth of more and more sceptical publics everywhere. The EU has some special difficulties in this regard given its limited financial means, its restricted policy competences, its physical distance, its consociational form of bargaining, and its indirect, predominantly legal, effect. Moreover, the more and more it “spills-over” into policy arenas that have been the exclusive domain of national and sub-national polities – health, energy, migration and even defence – the greater will be the demands on it to be able to extract voluntary compliance from those whom they are attempting to directly effect. Moreover, all of these will require the EU to engage not just in “negative” integration by removing existing barriers between member-states, but primarily by inserting new “positive” legal, fiscal and distributive obligations into their policy mix. Without doubt, the demands on political legitimacy (and voluntary compliance) will be significantly greater with regard to such measures.
What can it do to accomplish this?
Several items that I have already advocated in EP No. 5 should make some contribution. For example, lowering the voting age to 16 and granting extra votes to those with younger children might enhance turnout – especially among youths who are more favourably disposed to the process and more likely to consider themselves “European.” Most important, however, is the reform that would set aside a number of ‘at large’ seats in the European Parliament for candidates nominated by its party secretariats and selected by applying the formula of the Euro-Vision Song contest, namely, citizens would only be allowed to vote for candidates not of their own nationality. These is likely to have a positive impact on turnout (many more people vote in Euro-Vision Song contest than in elections for the EP) and creating enthusiasm, as well (it should be admitted) as a lot of strategic voting not for preferred performers but against those from nations that the participant would not like to win. All of these would probably require uniform continent-wide electoral rules, something that has repeatedly been rejected up to now. It is virtually an “iron law” of electoral politics that incumbent politicians will not support changes of the rules that have contributed to their winning and, even more so, if the modifications are perceived by them as benefiting their opponents.
Try to imagine a voting system for the European Parliament whose national rules might not be uniform, but that would only involve candidates nominated by its party secretariats, and that would be open to approval or disapproval by citizens on an equal basis from all of the member-states. Its selection rules for the winners would likely be proportional since PR is the dominant practice among them (Germany and Italy have mixed systems). Moreover, exclusive reliance on a first-past-the post decision-rule (very unlikely now that Great Britain is no longer a member) would mean an undesirable predominance of the simple counting of votes in units of very unequal size, in opposition to our more prudent advocacy of relying more on weighing intensities precisely out of respect for such differences. Needless to say, mobilizing large majorities may be more desirable from the orthodox perspective of democratic legitimation, but it has absolutely no chance of being chosen within the foreseeable future (intensities oblige).
Many of the other suggestions in this field have focused on increasing communication between national publics and supra-national agents by relying on Information and Communication Technology (ICT). We are dubious of the efficacy of such efforts. Contrary to initial expectations that this virtually costless, geographically indifferent, and anonymous phenomenon would stimulate deliberation among citizens and with their rulers, it has subsequently become apparent that its users tend more to choose to intensify their exchanges with others who already agree with them and, not infrequently, also tend to share dubious information (if not outright lies) about the intentions and behaviour of elites. ICT has become a powerful instrument for diminishing rather than increasing the legitimacy of established elites in the name of a nebulous “people” led by a single charismatic leader (which does not exist at the European level of more or less invisible “under the table” governance).
There seems to be no reason why EU officials should not resort more to these means of exchanging information via ICT about what they intend to do, what they are currently deciding and what they have eventually produced, but they should be wary that diminishing the confidentiality of their activity “online” could lead to greater difficulty in taking decisions, without contributing very much to increasing in their legitimacy.
The Commission, its agencies and other EU bodies have already made considerable efforts to contact and respond to individuals and organizations electronically, but given the reduced number of personnel and their high workload, it is likely that most of such messages are purely “formulatic” and cautiously “official.” They probably will not address the more specific content of demands and reactions from individual citizens and their interest associations and social movements.[5] While there is certainly a definite advantage to be gained from increasing communication between the Eurocracy and its presumed beneficiaries and ICT is a tempting answer to this opportunity, we are sceptical about its efficacy, particularly, its role in increasing the legitimacy of the process as a whole.
Philippe Schmitter
Emeritus Professor
European University Institute
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[1] The fact that most of the academics who study the EU have been trained exclusively in the discipline of international relations which systematically focuses only on the interaction of national states and international organizations perhaps explains why they have ignored the political developments within these (allegedly) sovereign units.
[2] European Commission, “Spring 2019 Standard Eurobarometer: Europeans Upbeat about the State of the European Union – Best Results in 5 Years,” press release, August 5, 2019.
[3] One supposed indicator of the EU’s illegitimacy, cited by many academics, is the rise of right-wing populist parties in almost all of its member-states. In my view, regional integration’s contribution to this phenomenon has been marginal compared to that of national governments and administrations. For a comprehensive, world-wide survey of public opinion about the state of democracy and its sceptics, see Doh Chull Shin, “Assessing Citizen Responses to Democracy: A Review and Synthesis of Recent Public Opinion Research,” https://escholarship.org/uc/itam/89k3z6g2.
[4] In the language of those who have been observing the EU, this is frequently referred to as a decline in the “permissive consensus” that previously was presumed to surround its activities and its replacement by “active constraint or dissensus” (even though evidence for the latter is not always convincing, especially in response to the current “compound crises).”
[5] Although there is considerable evidence that think-tanks in Bruxelles (often staffed by ex-officials of the Commission or its agencies) are successful in this communication process and have some effective influence on the content of directives and regulations. How much the “people” participate in these bodies or identify vicariously with their efforts is another matter.