The practice of what we call democracy today has always been embedded in the shadow of the Athenian polis of long ago. Not only did these ancient Greeks invent the concept by putting dėmos (people) and krάtos (rule) together, but through their writings about it (and usually critical of it), they explored its preconditions, processes and perversions. As a result, virtually no one for many centuries believed that it was a suitable form of government for anything larger than an ancient Greek city-state, a mountainous Swiss canton or a remote Icelandic island.
And, then, in the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries, democracy was re-invented in the name of a new ideology: liberalism. This both procedurally and substantively transformed its nature and practice by adapting it to the two major historical processes that had subsequently transformed the societies of the western part of the European continent: (1) the formation of larger and more internally diverse ‘national’ polities; and (2) the emergence of industrial capitalist economies. Its core inventions: representation by means of territorial sub-units with some autonomous powers, elections for office between candidates competing for the votes of individual citizens, constitutions enshrining checks and checks and balances between institutions with different constituencies and selection rules, and bills of rights protecting minorities (especially, the owners of productive property) contributed to making ‘liberal democracy’ the dominant regime in this region of the world (although not without some considerable delays and notoriously exceptional moments).
The apex of this evolution occurred during the so-called “Trentes Glorieuses” – the thirty year period of sustained economic growth and greater income equality that followed from the end of World War II. The core of this outcome was the momentary compatibility of liberal democracy and industrial capitalism based on the “magic formula” whereby increases in productivity were more or less shadowed by increases in the real income of those workers who produced this rise in productivity.
Thanks to a parallel process of undermining the collectivities that represented the interests of workers plus the more opaque distribution of income (and shares in capital) to the privileged owners/employees of increasingly dominant financial institutions, this delicate balance has been distorted and disparities in income (and even more in wealth) have multiplied, shattering the momentary compatibility of capital and labor.
As I have observed previously, today the regimes in this region of the world are facing a multitude of simultaneous challenges. Not coincidentally, these have tended to focus precisely on those liberal innovations: trust in elected representatives, capacity of political subunits (even of the national states themselves), expansion of executive power and administrative expertise, and the influence of those with protected and favoured property rights. It would not be an exaggeration to observe that it is liberalism more than democracy that is at stake in this compound crisis.
My assumption is that the task facing those who would seek to defend (and extend) democracy today is analogous to that faced by those liberals of the 18th and 19th centuries: How can it be made compatible with the two generic transformations that have subsequently affected Europe (and other regions of the world): (1) the globalization of human exchanges, and (2) the hegemony of finance capitalism. We need a new label for the ideology that should guide these reforms – “alter-liberalism” is my suggestion – but it should repeat the basic features of liberalism’s previous success, namely, to both preserve the basic democratic principles of citizen participation and accountability of rulers and to modify incrementally and consensually its practice. Hopefully, it will be possible to accomplish this within a much shorter timeframe.
Its contemporary antithesis is “illiberalism.” It too is reformist and pretends to address much the same two problems … but by doing the opposite: turning elections into popular acclamations of support for a leader who promises to rule unconditionally in favour of “the people” against corrupt elites beholden to foreign interests.
Nowhere is this challenge to liberal democracy more salient than with regard to the European Union. It was certainly not initially designed for such a task, but it has evolved to such a point that it alone may be capable of promoting and protecting ‘alter-liberal’ democracy, not only within its existing member states, but also in those that may subsequently become its members. Granted that there exists in several member-countries the ‘populist illusion’ that this can better be accomplished by a revival of the national (or, in some cases, even the sub-national) state and that this constitutes a serious challenge to those who would seek to enlarge, rather than diminish, the scale of effective government. Nevertheless, we are convinced that such efforts will not only be futile in substantive effect, but likely to result in polities exiting from regional institutions and instituting autocratic, rather than revised democratic, regimes.
***
The European Union today has most of the formal basic institutions of a liberal democracy, but it does not function as one, especially, not in the perception of most of its citizens. ‘Bruxelles’ seems remote, obscure (if not deliberately secretive), and dominated by a small group of faceless technocrats who keep issuing “directives” that have to be “transposed” by obedient national parliaments. This is hardly surprising since the founding fathers of the process had no intention of transposing democracy to the supra-national level. It was thought enough that all of the member-states had more or less similar liberal democratic regimes at the domestic level whose parliaments would approve the directives sent to them and whose citizens could be called upon occasionally to ratify important treaties in referendums. In addition to these “vicarious” sources of legitimacy, the “Eurocrats” in Bruxelles were also convinced that the respective national and sub-national publics would come to recognize the positive functional accomplishments of regional integration and accord it what came to known as “output legitimacy” as well.
However correct these assumptions seem to have been at its initiation, they are no longer valid. Not only has the process itself invaded more and more aspects of the lives of its citizens, but the two generic transformations mentioned above: globalization of exchanges and dominance of finance capitalism have, seemingly irrevocably, changed the attitudes of mass publics. To put it bluntly, the EU has become “politicized” far beyond initial expectations. It can no longer hide behind the (declining) legitimacy of the governments of its member-states, nor can it pretend that all of its decisions are or will be so-called “Pareto Optimal,” i.e. benefit everyone without harming anyone.
The task I have assigned to myself in these Europolitan Papers is how to reform its formal institutions and informal practices in order to reduce this perception of distance and ‘otherness’ and, thereby, lay a distinct and novel basis for the legitimacy of what would then become the world’s largest scale polity governed by a distinctive ‘alter-liberal’ democracy.
Before going into the specific reforms that I advocate, I should explicate the strategy that has guided my choices. While recognizing that the compound effect of the COVID crisis and, especially, the Russian invasion of Ukraine has revealed a sense of common purpose among EU member states and their citizens that could not have previously been imagined, I am still convinced that reforms intended to enhance the democratization of the EU should be introduced incrementally and differentially, following the method advocated by the ‘founding father’ of the process of European integration, Jean Monnet, whose slogan was “petit pas, grands effets.” I will be proposing modest measures that should not require the drafting of a new constitution or, perhaps, even the ratification of a new treaty. They should be introduced as modifications of existing commitments and not necessarily and immediately binding on all member-states. My expectation is that, once in effect, they will generate positive effects that will encourage initially reluctant members to join. This is in line with my initial core assumption: namely, that integration is a process, not a product and, therefore – unlike unification or federalization — its end-state remains indeterminate.
***
The obvious point of departure is the conduct of elections for the European Parliament (EP). This is the most salient point of contact between European citizens and ‘their’ governing institutions.[1]
One objective should be to encourage the emergence of a uniform, unique and novel format for these elections. For example, the EP could declare that the age of eligibility for voting should be lowered to 16 in all member-states and that children should be enfranchised by having one of their parents vote in lieu of them until they reach that age. A proportion of the seats in the EP – say, to begin 27, one for each member-state – would be set aside for the election of “at large” candidates nominated by the respective secretariats of existing parties in the EP and who would be chosen using the rules of the Euro-vision song contest, i.e. with citizens only eligible to vote for candidates not from their own country.[2]
A second reform would attach a lottery to each five year electoral cycle which would randomly select a set of winners equivalent in numbers and distribution of that of the deputies in the EP. These “Euroselectees” would be publicly announced and charged with distributing a fixed sum of money, say, 100,000 euros, to existing programs or agencies of the EU, or to associations advocating changes in EU policies. During the one month or so that this might take place, each selectee would be paid the equivalent of a deputy’s salary in the EP and assigned an ”administrative assistant” to handle the volume of correspondence and acquisition of information.
One could even envisage a well-publicized joint session of the EP in which these selectees would meet and discuss with their elected equivalents.
And this body of random “selectees” could be further exploited at some time in the future but empowering them as a “European Citizen’s Assembly.” Such an Assembly would meet for a restricted amount of time, during the recess of the EP and in its quarters, to listen to testimony and debate a “projet de loi” or an already approved “directive” – chosen by some sufficient minority of Euro-deputies. If they approved it, this should contribute positively to its subsequent legitimacy among the public or, if they disapproved, the issue would return to the EP for revision or exclusion.[3]
A third reform measure would transfer the financing of European level political parties and their electoral campaigns from the EU Commission to the citizens of Europe. Each voter would receive a voucher worth, say, 100 euros, that he or she could distribute to their party of choice. Needless to say, he or she would not be required to spend it on the party of their immediately chosen candidate, and they could even exercise their right to vote NOTA – “None of the Above” – by refusing to cast it at all. Parties would be empowered to borrow from the EU for current expenses in advance of receiving the vouchers, but those that subsequently failed to re-play their debts would be declared bankrupt and ineligible to run candidates in the following EP elections.
A second generic point of departure for reform concerns the internal rules of the executive agencies of the EU. The citizens of Europe deserve to know what arguments their respective national governments make with regard to specific policy issues, and what votes they eventually take. The ‘democratic gamble’ is that agreement will be made more reachable (and legitimate in its implementation) if the decision process is made more transparent to the public, than if it is conducted behind closed doors by a restricted elite group, however enlightened and other-regarding they are presumed to be. So far, perhaps, because it has been dominated by a combination of the norms of diplomacy and the practices of state bureaucracy, these bodies have cloaked themselves in secrecy. It is high time that they recognize that their decisions now penetrate into virtually all arenas of civilian life and, therefore, must be subject to public scrutiny not just after, but before they are taken.
Each of the “guardian institutions” of the EU – from the Commission to its multiple agencies – should establish an “advisory council” composed of associations, movements and think-tanks at the European level that have already expressed an interest in their subject matter and would, therefore, be capable of following their deliberations from the initial expression of an interest in intervening in some (often abstruse) functional arena (input), through its deliberations and decisions on the subject (throughput) to its eventual implementation and evaluation of its effect (output). These organizations would have the specialized knowledge to follow such a process and the established channels to communication such information to their member organizations and individuals.[4]
The third point of departure is likely to be more controversial and unlikely to be implemented without some formal revision of the EU’s founding treaties: namely, the elimination of the unanimity rule for making important decisions in the European Council and its replacement by an arrangement of “concordant majorities.” Given the unprecedented nature of their experiment in integrating previously sovereign polities by peaceful and gradual means (not to mention, the memories of past antagonisms and atrocities among the members), it is understandable that the founders relied upon “perfect consensus” or unanimity among national governments as a basic ground rule. This seemed best to guarantee protection from the potential “tyranny of the majority” orchestrated by the largest member-states – alone or in concert.
By now, when the respective populations and rulers know each other better, live in each other’s countries more often, trade and invest in each other economies like never before, even marry or co-habit with each other more frequently than ever, it should be possible to relax this constraint — and to begin to treat its population more like an embryonic, but still imperfect demos.
The most salient characteristic of this European demoi is its division into political units of unequal territory, population, level of development and natural resources. Thanks in part to the integration process they have converged in other aspects – levels of education, human capital, economic well-being and political freedom – but differences in size have remained constant as a source of concern. The most fearsome prospect for many is that the EU might convert itself into an “Empire” dominated by either its largest member-state, Germany, or a consortium of its two largest states, Germany and France.
Imagine the following: first, divide the member-states of the European Council according to population size into three, more or less equal in number, “collegii” – one for large, one for medium and one for small countries.[5] Then, subsequent decisions would become valid provided they attracted a majority of votes, weighted according to national size, in each of the three collegii. Individual member-states could still express their dissatisfaction, but not unilaterally prevent the EU from entering into new policy areas or expanding its role in existing ones. Under pre-established conditions, the dissenters would, however, be able to prevent the application of some of such measures within their respective territories.
This principle could also be applied in the European Parliament for certain ‘foundational’ decisions, assuming that its application in the Council would tend to increase the extent of “differentiated integration.” Only those that had “opted in” for a given policy would be entitled to vote on legislation concerning it. The “Opt-outers” could participate in the discussion and hope to influence the outcome, but not be able to amend or block it.
***
I have by no means exhausted the range and substance of reforms that might be feasible and desirable in light of my objective of both preparing the European Union for confronting the multiple challenges that are currently facing it and converting it into the world’s first and largest scale ‘post-liberal’ democracy. I invite those who read this essay to send us their agreements and disagreements with its proposals and, even more, to excite me with ideas that I have not even thought of.
Philippe Schmitter
Emeritus Professor
European University Institute
Comments
Readers are welcome to send comments to egpp@eui.eu. Comments will be reviewed before publication below and will include the name of the author.
[1] One innovative reform would be to issue before each election to the EP a “Report Card” for each deputy – even for those who have not been re-nominated by their national party. It would contain an indicator of his or her participation in its activity based on the percentage attendance of that individual in general sessions, as well as the committee or committees on which he or she is expected to serve, Admittedly, the EP’s very cumbersome move back and forth from Bruxelles to Strasbourg has proven to be a serious impediment to regular attendance. Moreover, there is evidence that these national and sub-national parties do not always choose as candidates members who have already demonstrated a particular interest in European affairs or re-nominate those who have been especially active in them once elected, since these politicians are more likely to pay less attention to the matters of special interest to their national or sub-national constituencies.
[2] A definitely more ambitious reform would be to make the EU’s inter-institutional decision-making more “parliamentary” by according to the European Parliament a determining role in the selection of Commissioners, even if the candidates were limited to those nominated by the European Council or the Council of Ministers. Some version of this has been suggested by many observers and repeated rejected by the member-states.
[3] This mode of selection would ensure that those chosen would already have sufficient knowledge of the issues facing European institutions and a “personal stake in the game.” Strictly random modes for selecting a “European People’s Assembly” face a monumental challenge of selectees declining to participate for lack of knowledge or interest and of those who agree to participate being manipulated by the much better informed and motivated “mentors” assigned to them.
[4] The European Union already has an Economic and Social Council at the most general level, but it has proven incapable of providing and communicating the sort of information that can effectively monitor and control decision-making or of communicating significantly with its members.
[5] To provide an example: Malta, Luxembourg, Cyprus, Estonia, Slovenia, Latvia, Lithuania, Ireland, Finland, Denmark and Slovakia would go into the first collegio; Bulgaria, Austria, Sweden, Hungary, Portugal, Belgium, Czech Republic and Greece into the second; and Netherlands, Romania, Poland, Spain, Italy, France and Germany into the third.