Nothing is more deeply entrenched in the popular perception of liberal democracy than the image of competition between political parties regularly competing for the representation of territorial constituencies in “free and fair” elections. Without these organizations offering alternative conceptions of what governments can and should do, nominating competing candidates for office, campaigning on their behalf, forming governments among those elected, organizing the internal operations of the legislative process and providing citizens with a reasonably consistent collective identity across generations, it is almost impossible to imagine how such a political arrangement could possibly work – least of all, persist for such a long period of time.
One of the most serious accusations levelled at the European Union as presently constituted is that it does not have “its own” party system – and, therefore, cannot possible be or become a legitimate democratic polity. At best, it has borrowed and cobbled together vicariously elements from the national and sub-national party-systems of member-states and given them a common label within the confines of the European Parliament. Virtually, no one outside Bruxelles (or Strasbourg) even knows what these labels are, much less orients his or her political behaviour accordingly.
In Euro-Speak, this situation has been described by referring to EP elections as ‘secondary’ in nature. Not only have the candidates been chosen exclusively by ‘primary’ parties in the member states, but most of the issues that motivate Euro-citizens to participate in them are national in nature and in presentation. This, in turn, led to two perversions of the electoral process: (1) less and less of those eligible to vote bothered to do so; and (2) when they did, they often did so “strategically” to send a message of discontent back to their national or sub-national politicians.
If, as we have been suggesting from the start of these Europolitan Papers, it has become increasingly imperative for the emerging Euro-polity to become credibly democratic as it “spills-over” into substantive policy-arenas such a health and welfare – not to mention: external defense and internal policing – that cannot be simply regulated and implemented according to functionally appropriate and widely shared standards, but require making collective choices between increasingly controversial outcomes with differential social impacts. Given the seeming inevitability of this transformation, the EU will have to acquire a novel basis for its legitimation and, since that will have to be democratic, the creation of a viable and publicly acceptable European-level party system cannot be avoided.
One feature of well-established national politics has plagued efforts to do this ever since the introduction of direct elections for the European Parliament in 1979. The emergence of public opinion with regard to regional integration did not correspond nicely with the basic underlying class-based cleavage embedded in national party systems. On both on the Left and the Right, clusters emerged that were in favour of and opposed to the process. Faced with this cross-cutting situation, existing national parties prudently adopted a common policy: they tended to avoid any reference to European integration in their manifestos, campaigns or candidate selections. “Europe” was a non-issue, especially in national elections, but even in EP elections. The academics who credited the EC, EEC and EU with a ”permissive consensus” reflected this strategic choice and the founding-fathers of the process were no doubt delighted that it could progress so far without generating broader political controversy.
Such a situation was destined not to persist. Gradually and fitfully, the widening scope and impact of EU policies has generated greater controversy. One of the most salient themes with regard to the EU has become its “politization.” The “permissive consensus” become a “constraining dissensus” and national parties have become increasingly compelled to take public positions opposing or supporting it.
Unfortunately, the contemporary context would not seem at all favourable for converting such an effort into a coherent and distinctive European party system. At no time in the past fifty or more years have domestic parties in Europe been weaker – and, presumably, less capable of protecting their acquired status and privileges and even less capable of extending them to the level of Europe as a whole. Virtually, without exception traditional “centrist” parties in member-states have declined in membership, identification and electoral support. New parties have proliferated, fragmenting the offer to citizens and polarizing the appeals of their leaders. Electoral outcomes have greatly increased in volatility and governing coalitions become more difficult to form and sustain.
The very existence of these trends almost across the board in Europe is a proximate indicator that something resembling a continent-wide electorate already exists in embryo but is being restrained in its emergence by an increasingly anachronistic set of local rules.[1]
The irony, however, is that precisely because of their unprecedented weakness, pre-existing national and sub-national political parties have demonstrated a great reluctance to give up the symbolic and material resources associated with their competing in elections to the European Parliament. The “demand” for something trans-nationally novel and promising in the realm of political representation may be there, but the “supply” has, so far, proven weak and illusory.
Where then to start? I have already advanced a number of a suggestions for reform that might contribute to increasing electoral turnout and focusing greater attention on European policy issues – both of which might contribute to the emergence of a party system at that level: a subset of ‘at large’ candidates nominated by the secretariats in the EP, lowering the voting age to 16, parental voting for younger children, citizen vouchers for directly supporting EP election campaigns and, eventually, even the nomination by the EP of candidates for the Commission presidency and its Directorate Generals – as well as subsequent votes of approval or disapproval for their performance. Even non-binding expressions of discontent by a sufficient number of the party secretariats in the EP or Euro-deputies individually might be sufficient to ensure greater accountability for performance and greater public recognition for those involved.
It is not difficult to imagine what an eventual European party system might look like and how it might function to form and monitor the region’s executive institutions and agencies. Its center of gravity (as has long been the case at the national level for most member-states) would be a ‘centrist’ Party of Euro-Loyalists dedicated to conserving the acquis communautaire and ensuring that it not be extended beyond the limits of subsidiarity (however defined). On one of its flanks, would be a Party of Euro-Sceptics advocating a return to national or even sub-national authority in many policy arenas and, on the other, a Party of Euro-Enthusiasts advocating the opposite. It would be misleading to presume that the Sceptics and Enthusiasts would be equivalent to the historically dominant — Left-Right – cleavage at the national level, since it would seem that for the foreseeable future, popular attitudes toward European integration will continue to cut across this class-based source of domestic conflict. It is precisely this non-alignment between levels of aggregation that has made it so difficult to simply re-produce by aggregation the prevailing national cleavage structures into plausible and operable Euro-parties.
Philippe Schmitter
Emeritus Professor
European University Institute
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[1] Nor can the existence of such party decadence be attributed exclusively, however, to the advent of European integration itself, since similar trends can and have been observed elsewhere among advanced capitalist liberal democracies.